The Verdict
On Tuesday, Syria’s Fourth Criminal Court in Damascus sentenced former President Bashar al-Assad to death in absentia, finding him guilty of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed during the country’s nearly 14-year civil war. The conflict killed roughly half a million people and displaced millions more. His younger brother, Maher al-Assad, who commanded the notorious 4th Armored Division, also received a death sentence in absentia. Former security official Atef Najib, who was tried in person, was sentenced to death as well.
The ruling is the first conviction against Bashar al-Assad by Syria’s post-Assad authorities since his government collapsed in December 2024. For victims and their families, it represents a formal judicial acknowledgment of crimes committed under the former government.
But the verdict comes with an immediate complication.

In Absentia
Assad was not in the courtroom. Neither was Maher. Both were tried and sentenced in absentia, a legal mechanism that allows a court to proceed without the defendant being present.
Trials in absentia are not unusual in cases involving fugitives, but they do change what a verdict can actually accomplish. A conviction establishes that a court has found the defendant guilty and places that finding on the legal record. What it cannot do on its own is put a fugitive in a prison cell.
For Syria, that distinction is critical.
Why Assad Is in Russia
When Assad’s government fell in December 2024 following a rapid rebel offensive, the former president and his family fled Syria and were granted asylum in Russia. Assad has remained in Moscow since then, outside the reach of the Syrian authorities now seeking to hold him accountable.
Russia intervened militarily in Syria in 2015, providing crucial support to Assad’s government and helping it regain territory from opposition forces.
That history matters now because Syria is seeking the return of a former president who was given refuge by a country that had been one of his most important international allies.
The question is no longer only whether Syria can convict Assad. It is whether Russia will cooperate with the government that replaced him.
A Sentence Is Not an Arrest
A court can issue a conviction and a sentence. Enforcing that sentence is another matter.
Syria’s new authorities can prosecute Assad, find him guilty and sentence him to death. But none of those actions gives Damascus physical control over a man who remains in Russia.
Syria has already sought Russia’s cooperation in bringing Assad back. The request now moves the case beyond the Syrian courtroom and into the realm of extradition, diplomatic negotiations and international cooperation.
International mechanisms can help states locate and pursue people wanted for prosecution, but they do not automatically compel the country where a fugitive is living to surrender him.
For Syria, that leaves the central problem unchanged:
It has a verdict. It does not have Assad.
Russia Holds the Key
For now, Moscow controls the most important variable: Assad’s physical custody.
Syria can issue a judgment, request his extradition and pursue international cooperation, but bringing Assad back ultimately depends on what Russia is willing to do.
That makes the case about more than the authority of a Syrian court. It is also a test of the relationship between Syria’s new government and Moscow.
Russia gave Assad refuge after his government collapsed, while Moscow is also seeking to preserve its strategic interests in post-Assad Syria.
Handing Assad over would therefore carry political consequences for Russia’s relationship with Damascus.
The Syrian court can decide Assad’s guilt. But without Russian cooperation, Damascus cannot easily bring him within reach of that verdict.
Does the Death Sentence Make Extradition Harder?
The death sentence could create another complication if Syria pursues Assad’s extradition.
Some countries restrict extradition when a person could face execution, particularly where domestic or regional human-rights protections require assurances that the death penalty will not be carried out.
That does not mean Assad’s sentence automatically prevents Russia from returning him. It means the nature of the punishment could become part of any future legal or diplomatic negotiations over his extradition.
For Damascus, however, the immediate challenge remains political rather than procedural.
Before Syria can enforce the sentence, it first has to get Assad back.
What Does This Mean for Transitional Justice?
For Syria’s new government, the Assad case is about more than one former president. It is part of a much larger effort to establish transitional justice after decades of authoritarian rule and a devastating civil war.
That process involves investigating abuses, prosecuting those responsible, recognizing victims and preserving evidence of crimes committed during the conflict.
Syria’s new government now faces a familiar dilemma shared by countries emerging from dictatorship or mass violence: how do you hold perpetrators accountable when some of them are beyond your reach?
Trials in absentia, international cooperation and other accountability mechanisms can establish responsibility and preserve the historical record, even when a defendant cannot immediately be brought before a court.
But Assad’s case shows the limits of that process.
A conviction can establish responsibility. It cannot, by itself, guarantee custody.

A Verdict Without the Defendant
For Assad’s victims, the ruling can carry enormous symbolic weight. It formally places the former president’s crimes on the record of Syria’s post-Assad justice system and represents a significant step toward accountability.
But symbolic justice and enforceable justice are not the same.
The court in Damascus has delivered its verdict. Assad remains in Russia.
Whether that verdict ever becomes a punishment will depend not only on Syria’s courts, but on decisions made in Moscow.
And that makes Assad’s death sentence more than a question of justice. It is a test of Syria’s new government and its ability to pursue accountability across borders.
Can transitional justice reach a former ruler protected by the country that once helped keep him in power?
Reporting by Tiara Dwi Kinanti. Additional reporting, analysis and editorial context by Observer Diplomat.















